This paper provides a novel axiomatic analysis of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour in economies with heterogeneous optimising agents endowed with unequal amounts of physical and human capital. A de…nition of exploitation is proposed, which emphasises the relational nature of exploitation and the resulting inequalities in the allocation of labour and income. It is shown that, among all of the major de…nitions, this is the only one which satis…es two formally weak and normatively salient axioms, and allows one to generalise a number of core insights of exploitation theory.
Introduction
What is exploitation? In political philosophy, the most general de…nition a¢ rms that A exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this de…nition leaves two major issues in need of a precise speci…cation, namely the kind of unfairness involved and the structure of the relationship between A and B that allows A to take advantage of B. There is considerable debate in the economic and philosophical literature on both issues. Although both aspects of exploitative relations are arguably crucial, the analytical focus of this paper is on the unfairness, or more precisely, on the economic inequalities involved in the concept of exploitation. 1 To be speci…c, this paper analyses the theory of exploitation as an unequal exchange (hereafter, UE) of labour, according to which exploitative relations are characterised by systematic di¤erences between the amount of labour that individuals contribute to the economy, in some relevant sense, and the amount of labour they receive, in some relevant sense, via their income.
There are several reasons to focus on labour as the measure of the injustice of exploitative relations. First, in many economic interactions, the notion of exploitation is inextricably linked with some form of labour exchange. Second, as Fleurbaey [7] , [8] has argued, the UE de…nition of exploitation captures some inequalities in the distribution of material well-being and free hours that are -at least prima facie -of normative relevance. For instance, they are relevant for inequalities of well-being freedom, as discussed by Rawls [19] and Sen [28] , 2 because material well-being and free hours are two key determinants of individual well-being freedom. Third, a UE exploitation-free allocation coincides with the so-called proportional solution, a well-known fair allocation rule whereby every agent's income is proportional to her contribution to the economy (Roemer and Silvestre [25] ). Proportionality is a strongly justi…ed normative principle, whose philosophical foundations can be traced back to Aristotle (Maniquet [14] ) and it can be justi…ed in terms of the Kantian categorical imperative (Roemer [23] , [24] ). Empirical studies have shown that proportionality is indeed a widely held idea of equity (Tornblom [29] ). Finally, in a private-ownership economy with positive pro…ts, class and UE exploitation are strictly related, and they re ‡ect an unequal distribution of assets (Roemer [22] ; Yoshihara [34] ; Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] ): in equilibrium the wealthy emerge as exploiters and members of the capitalist class, whereas the poor are exploited and members of the working class. From this perspective, UE exploitative relations are relevant because they re ‡ect unequal opportunities of life options, due to di¤erential ownership of productive assets.
Although the de…nition of UE exploitation is seemingly intuitive, it has proved surprisingly di¢ cult to provide a fully satisfactory general theory of exploitation. Outside of stylised, two-class economies with a simple linear (Leontief) technology, homogeneous labour, and restrictive assumptions on agents'preferences over consumption and leisure, two problems arise. First, the appropriate de…nition of the amounts of labour 'contributed to'and 'received by'agents is not obvious, and several approaches have been proposed, which incorporate rather di¤erent, and often implicit, normative and positive intuitions. 3 Second, the core insights of exploitation theory do not necessarily hold (Yoshihara and Veneziani [38] ).
In his classic work, John Roemer [20] , [22] has analysed the normative foundations of exploitation theory and has extended exploitation analysis to include a general convex technology, a complex class structure, and optimising agents. This paper builds on Roemer's seminal work and extends his key insights from both a substantive and a methodological viewpoint.
To be speci…c, exploitation is analysed in economies with a general convex technology and optimising agents with heterogeneous preferences and with di¤erent amounts of both physical and human capital. 4 The formal model is outlined in section 2: it extends Roemer's [20] , [22] classic economies, and the related equilibrium notion, to include some key features of advanced economies, such as heterogeneous skills and general preferences over con-sumption and leisure, that are central in debates about the normative and positive relevance of the concept of exploitation.
One substantive contribution of the paper is to provide a novel de…nition, which extends the core insights of exploitation theory and allows one to characterise the exploitation status of all agents in such general economies. This de…nition is conceptually related to the 'New Interpretation'(Duménil [1] , [2] ; Foley [9] , [10] ; Duménil, Foley, and Lévy [3] ), and it states that an agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she contributes is greater (resp., lower) than the share of aggregate social labour that she receives via her income.
This approach de…nes exploitation as a feature of the competitive allocation of social labour rather than as the result of productive ine¢ ciencies, or imperfections in the labour market. Unlike the main received approaches, it has a clear empirical content, for it is …rmly anchored to the actual data of the economy. Perhaps more importantly, it clearly captures the inequalities arising from exploitative relations. First, it identi…es exploitation as a social relation: in equilibrium there are some exploited agents if and only if there are some exploiters. As Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] have shown, except for the New Interpretation, none of the main de…nitions in the literature satis…es this fundamental relational property in general. Second, if the New Interpretation is adopted, exploitative relations are characterised by inequalities in individual income/labour ratios, which is an important normative intuition of the UE approach, as Fleurbaey [7] , [8] has forcefully argued.
Another contribution of the paper is methodological: UE exploitation is analysed by using a novel, general axiomatic framework. 5 An axiomatic approach was long overdue in exploitation theory. As already noted, a number of alternative de…nitions with rather di¤erent normative and positive implications can be, and have in fact been, proposed: the main approaches are discussed in section 3. By adopting an axiomatic method, this paper suggests to start from …rst principles, thus explicitly discussing the intuitions underlying UE exploitation.
To be speci…c, section 4 analyses two axioms. The …rst is called Labour Exploitation, and it restricts the way in which the set of exploited agents is identi…ed. This axiom is interpreted as a minimal necessary condition to capture the core intuitions of exploitation theory, and indeed all of the main approaches satisfy it (see Morishima [16] ; Foley [9] ; Roemer [22] ; Flaschel [5] , 5 For a related approach see Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] and Yoshihara [34] . 4 [6] ). Second, the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle states that, in equilibrium, propertyless workers are exploited if and only if pro…ts are positive. This axiom incorporates the intuition that in private ownership economies, pro…ts are one of the key mechanisms to transform unequal holdings of scarce productive assets into exploitative relations, unequal exchange of labour, and inequalities in well-being freedom. Given private ownership of productive assets, one should expect pro…ts to allow a transfer of social products and social labour towards wealthy agents. In equilibria with zero pro…ts, the allocation of social labour and income is driven by the wage, and so no UE of labour should occur even if productive assets are unequally owned. Theorem 1 provides the …rst rigorous characterisation of the class of de…nitions satisfying Labour Exploitation which meet the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle. Based on this characterisation, Corollary 1 shows that, among all the main de…nitions, the New Interpretation is the only one that preserves the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle.
The Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle captures some important and widely held intuitions in exploitation theory, 6 and so Theorem 1 provides strong support for the New Interpretation as the appropriate formulation of UE exploitation. Yet two objections may be raised at this point. First, a focus on the poorest segment of the working class, namely agents without any physical assets, is appropriate from the axiomatic viewpoint: focusing on a strict subset of agents implies that the axioms impose formally weak and theoretically robust restrictions on the set of admissible de…nitions. Yet one may argue that this is reductive and some features of capitalist economies should be explicitly considered, which make the issue of exploitation a contentious one today -such as the fact that many workers own some non-labour assets, and even stock in …rms, through their pension funds. Second, although exploitation is traditionally analysed by focusing on equilibria (Morishima [16] ; Roemer [20] ), one may question general equilibrium-type constructions as representations of allocation and distribution in market economies because they depend on the often tacit assumption 6 The relation between exploitation and pro…ts features prominently, for example, in the literature on the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem (see, among the many contributions, Morishima [16] , [17] ; Roemer [20] ; Krause [13] ; Fleurbaey [7] ; Flaschel [5] , [6] ; Yoshihara and Veneziani [38] ). The Fundamental Marxian Theorem and the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle are related from a broad conceptual viewpoint, but as discussed in Section 5.1 below, they are logically and theoretically distinct. of equal-treatment. 7 A general theory of exploitation should be able to take account of transactions at disequilibrium prices and the resulting inequity in distribution endogenous to market allocation.
Sections 5 and 6 present two extensions of the analysis, which address these objections and provide further support for the New Interpretation. Section 5 shows that the New Interpretation can be extended to analyse the exploitation status of all agents, in economies with heterogeneous preferences, physical assets, and skills (Theorem 2). Further, if the New Interpretation is adopted, positive pro…ts are synonymous with exploitative social relations: some agents are exploited if and only if there is someone exploiting them (Corollary 2), a desirable property that is unique to the New Interpretation. Section 6 proves that, under the New Interpretation, there exists a relation between exploitation and pro…ts even out of equilibrium (Theorem 3).
Section 7 concludes and suggests some directions for further research.
The model
This section presents a generalisation of Roemer's [20] , [22] classic economies and of the related equilibrium notion.
Production
An economy comprises a set of agents N = f1; :::; N g. Let R (R + ) be the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. Let 0 denote the null vector. Production technology is freely available to all agents, who can operate any activity in the production set P , which has elements of the form = ( l ; ; ) where l 2 R + is the e¤ective labour input of the process; 2 R n + are the inputs of the produced goods used in the process; and 2 R n + are the outputs of the n goods. It is assumed that production displays constant returns to scale, or more precisely that P is a closed convex cone. 8 The set of production activities feasible with l = k units of e¤ective labour can be de…ned as follows:
; ) 2 P j l = kg , 6 and @P f 2 P j @ 0 2 P s.t. 0 > g is the frontier of P . Let the net output vector arising from be denoted as b . For any c 2 R n + , the set of activities that produce at least c as net output is: 9
(c) f 2 P j b = cg :
Agents
This paper investigates exploitation when heterogeneous agents are endowed with unequal amounts of physical and human capital. In the economy, agents produce, consume, and trade labour. On the production side, they can either sell their labour-power or hire workers to work on their capital, or they can be self-employed and work on their own assets. More precisely, for all 2 N , let s > 0 be agent 's skill level and let ! 2 R n + be the vector of productive assets inherited by . Then, = ( l ; ; ) 2 P is the production process operated by as a self-employed producer, with her own capital, where l = s a l and a l is the labour time expended by ; = l ; ; 2 P is the production process that operates by hiring (e¤ective) labour l ; = s l is 's e¤ective labour supply, where l is the labour time supplied by on the market. Thus, let = (a l + l ) be the total amount of labour time expended by , and let = l + = s be the total amount of e¤ective labour performed by , either as a selfemployed producer or working for some other agent. 10 On the consumption side, let C R n + be the consumption space of each agent with generic element c as a consumption vector of agent , and assume that total labour hours expended by each agent cannot exceed the total amount of time available, which is normalised to one. Agent 's welfare is representable by a monotonic function u : C [0; 1] ! R + , which is increasing in consumption and decreasing in labour time. For the sake of simplicity, and with no loss of generality, in what follows, u is assumed to be strictly monotonic on C in at least one argument c i , for all , and the consumption space for any such goods is assumed to be su¢ ciently large. 9 For all vectors x; y 2 R n , x = y if and only if x i = y i (i = 1; : : : ; n); x y if and only if x = y and x 6 = y; x > y if and only if x i > y i (i = 1; : : : ; n). 10 The model does not include di¤erent types of labour to be used in production. This is only for simplicity: this additional source of heterogeneity can be dealt with, albeit at the cost of a substantial increase in technicalities.
Let p denote the 1 n vector of commodity prices and let w denote the wage rate per unit of e¤ective labour. Given (p; w), each agent is assumed to choose a plan ( ; ; ; c ) to maximise her welfare subject to the constraint that (1) net income is su¢ cient for consumption plans; (2) wealth is su¢ cient to purchase the inputs necessary for production plans; (3) production plans are technically feasible; and (4) the consumption bundle is in the feasible set and working time does not exceed the total amount of time available. Formally, each agent solves: 11
M P is a generalisation of similar optimisation programmes in Roemer [20] , [22] and in Yoshihara [34] . As in standard microeconomic theory, agents are not assumed to be simply 'agents of capital'or to produce for production's own sake: they are endowed with general preferences over consumption and leisure, u (c ; ). However, following Roemer [20] , [22] , M P di¤ers from the standard approach in two respects. First, it incorporates the simultaneous role of economic actors as consumers (see, in particular, (1) and (4)) and producers (see, in particular, (2) and (3)), so that no separate consideration of …rms is necessary. As shown below, although agents are not assumed to maximise pro…ts, pro…t maximisation is a corollary of M P . Second, it explicitly takes into account the time structure of the production process. It is thus assumed that, at the beginning of the period, agents need to lay out in advance the capital needed for production and they can do so only by using their own wealth (see (2) ). 12 Production then takes place and gross revenues (including wages and pro…ts) can be used to …nance consumption and the reproduction of initial wealth at the end of the period (see (1) ). 13 
Equilibrium
Let E P; N ; (u ) 2N ; (s ) 2N ; (! ) 2N , or as a shorthand notation E, denote the economy with technology P , agents N , utility functions (u ) 2N , labour skills (s ) 2N , and productive endowments (! ) 2N . Let the set of all such economies be denoted by E. Following Roemer ([20], p.514; [22] , pp.64, 114), the equilibrium concept can be de…ned.
and an associated pro…le of actions ( ; ; ; c ) 2N such that:
(labour market equilibrium).
In other words, at a reproducible solution (i) every agent optimises; (iii) there are enough resources for production plans in aggregate; and (iv) the labour market clears. Condition (ii) states that aggregate net outputs should at least su¢ ce for aggregate consumption. This is equivalent to requiring that the vector of social endowments does not decrease component-wise, because (ii) is equivalent to P
! , which states that aggregate stocks at the beginning of next period should not be smaller than aggregate stocks at the beginning of the current period. Indeed, although the reproducible solution is de…ned as a temporary equilibrium in a static general equilibrium framework, it can be seen as a one-shot slice of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. 14 By the assumptions on u , it immediately follows that both the wage and the prices of all goods must be nonnegative, and at least one good must have a strictly positive price, at any non-trivial reproducible solution -i.e. at any equilibrium where some production process is activated.
Let max = max 2P pb w l p denote the maximum pro…t rate that can be obtained at prices (p; w), and let P (p; w) = n 2 P j max = pb w l p o denote the set of production processes that yield the maximum pro…t rate. Lemma 1 derives some useful properties of the equilibria of the economy.
Lemma 1: Let (p; w) be a non-trivial reproducible solution for E 2 E such that P 2N c 0. Then, (i) pb w l = 0 for some 2 P n f0g, and (ii) ; 2 P (p; w) for all .
The formal proofs of all results are in Appendix 8.2. However, the intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple: by individual optimality (De…nition 1(i)), in equilibrium agents will only operate activities that yield the maximum pro…t rate (Lemma 1(ii)) and will not operate any activities that yield negative pro…ts. Therefore at any reproducible solution where at least some production process is activated, pro…ts must be nonnegative (Lemma 1(i)).
De…ning labour exploitation
In the UE approach, exploitative relations are characterised by systematic di¤erences between the labour that agents contribute to the economy and the labour 'received'by them, which is given by the amount of labour contained, or embodied, in some relevant consumption bundle(s). Therefore, in order to de…ne exploitation status, it is necessary both to select the relevant reference bundle(s) and to identify their labour content. In general economies, neither choice is obvious, and various de…nitions have, in fact, been proposed. In this section, some of the main de…nitions -suitably extended to economies with heterogeneous skills -are brie ‡y analysed. The purpose is to illustrate the key issues involved in de…ning exploitation in general economies, rather than to provide a comprehensive survey of alternative approaches.
As a starting point, consider a simple economy with a standard Leontief technology (A; L), where A is a square n n nonnegative and productive matrix and L is a strictly positive 1 n vector describing, respectively, the amount of each input and the (homogeneous) labour necessary to produce one unit of the n goods. Assume that all agents have equal skills and consume the same subsistence bundle b. Under these assumptions, the de…nition of UE exploitation is relatively uncontroversial: the reference bundle is b and its labour content is equal to vb, where v = L(I A) 1 is the vector describing the labour embodied in one unit of each good. Then agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she contributes to the economy, , is greater (resp., lower) than the labour she receives, vb.
As soon as these assumptions are dropped, however, the de…nition of exploitation is not obvious. If more general technologies are considered, the simple generalisation of the standard approach can yield paradoxical results -such as bundles containing a negative amount of labour -and so various de…nitions of the labour contained in a given bundle have been proposed, focusing either on actual production activities in the economy or on some feasible, possibly counterfactual, technology. Moreover, if agents do not consume a given, equal subsistence bundle, then the choice of reference bundle is not obvious: one may focus either on agents'actual choices or on some alternative (a¤ordable) bundle. The former approach takes a subjectivist view by emphasising the actual choices made by agents in the determination of their exploitation status. Scholars adopting the latter perspective argue instead that a subjectivist perspective makes exploitation depend on consumption decisions so that agents who consume di¤erent bundles but are otherwise identical may end up having a di¤erent exploitation status.
In his classic de…nition, Morishima [16] focuses on the bundles actually consumed by agents, c , but adopts a counterfactual de…nition of labour content, whereby for all bundles c 2 R n + :
According to Morishima, agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she contributes to the economy, , is greater (resp., lower) than l:v: (c ), that is the minimum amount of (e¤ective) labour necessary to produce c as net output. Formally: De…nition 2 has some desirable characteristics, according to Morishima ([16] , pp.616-618): the notion of exploitation is well-de…ned because l:v: (c) is unique, well-de…ned and positive whenever c 6 = 0; 15 and exploitation status is determined prior to and independent of price information, as in the standard Marxian approach, focusing only on production data. According to Roemer [21] , [22] , however, De…nition 2 is conceptually ‡awed as it identi…es exploitation status (potentially) based on production techniques that will never be used by pro…t maximising capitalists, and the labour received by agents must be based on equilibrium price information. Like Morishima [16] , Roemer [22] focuses on the bundle actually consumed by the agents but argues that its labour content should be given by the minimum amount of (e¤ective) labour necessary to produce it as net output among pro…t-rate-maximising activities at given equilibrium prices, for only the latter production processes will be activated in a capitalist economy.
Formally, for all c 2 R n + , the labour content of c is de…ned as follows:
Then, agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she contributes to the economy, , is greater (resp., lower) than the minimum amount of (e¤ective) labour necessary to produce c as net output with a pro…t-rate-maximising activity at given equilibrium prices. Although they preserve some important insights of standard exploitation theory, 16 De…nitions 2 and 3 have been criticised because exploitation status depends on counterfactual amounts of labour content. For the production activities yielding l:v: (c ) or l:v: (c ; p; w) may be di¤erent from those actually used in equilibrium. According to critics, this use of counterfactuals is theoretically undesirable and it makes exploitation an empirically vacuous notion, since the computation of l:v: (c ) and l:v: (c ; p; w) requires information that is not available, including, in Morishima's own words, "information about all the available techniques of production, actually chosen or potentially usable" ( [16] , pp.617, italics added). 17 16 See section 5.1 for a brief discussion. For a more thorough analysis, see Yoshihara and Veneziani [38] . 17 For a thorough discussion, see, for example, Flaschel [5] , [6] .
An alternative approach has been recently proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] , [37] and Yoshihara [34] . For any p 2 R n + and c 2 R n + , let B (p; c)
x 2 R n + j px = pc be the set of bundles that cost exactly as much as c at prices p. Let p;w P 2N ( + ) denote the aggregate equilibrium production activity at a reproducible solution (p; w) for economy E.
De…nition 4:
Consider an economy E 2 E. Let (p; w) be a reproducible solution for E such that p;w is the aggregate production activity. For each
The labour content of c at the aggregate production activity p;w is c p;w l .
According to De…nition 4, the total labour content of aggregate net output, b p;w , is equal to total social labour, p;w l . Then, for any bundle c whose value does not exceed national income, the labour contained in c is equal to the fraction c of social labour necessary to produce a fraction of aggregate net output, c b p;w , that has the same value as c. 18 As in Roemer's [22] approach, in De…nition 4 the labour content of a bundle can be identi…ed only if the price vector is known. Yet social relations play a more central role, because the de…nition of labour content requires a prior knowledge of the social reproduction point and labour content is explicitly linked to the redistribution of total social labour. Then: De…nition 5 is conceptually related to the 'New Interpretation'(Duménil [1] , [2] ; Foley [9] , [10] ). In fact, for any agent 2 N , c represents 's share of national income, and so c p;w l is the share of social labour that receives by earning income barely su¢ cient to buy c . Then, as in the New Interpretation, the notion of exploitation is related to the production and distribution of national income and social labour, and it depends on empirically observable magnitudes. Yet, De…nition 5 has been criticised because, unlike De…nitions 2 and 3, the actual consumption choices of the agents are only indirectly relevant to determine exploitation status, and unlike De…nition 2, the notion of exploitation depends on price information.
In summary, various de…nitions with di¤erent normative and positive implications can be, and have in fact been, proposed. The question is how to adjudicate alternative approaches. This is the topic of the next section.
An axiomatic approach
In this section, a novel, general axiomatic framework is developed in order to analyse exploitation theory. The adoption of an axiomatic method allows us to adjudicate alternative approaches by starting from …rst principles, thus explicitly discussing the intuitions underlying UE exploitation.
The …rst step of the analysis is to de…ne a domain condition: an axiom that captures the core insights of UE exploitation shared by all of the main approaches, including those discussed in section 3. In the UE approach, exploitative relations are characterised by systematic di¤erences between the labour that agents contribute to the economy and the labour 'received' by them, which is given by the amount of labour contained, or embodied, in some relevant consumption bundle(s). The domain condition sets some weak restrictions both on the choice of the reference bundle(s) and on the de…nition of their labour content that all of the main UE approaches satisfy.
Let W f 2 N j ! = 0g be the set of agents with no initial endowments. The economies analysed in this paper are more general than the polarised, two-class societies usually considered in the literature, and in the next section the exploitation status of all agents is derived. Yet the set W is of clear focal interest in exploitation theory: theoretically, if any agents are exploited, then one would expect propertyless individuals to be among them, if they work at all. It is therefore opportune, from an axiomatic viewpoint, to focus on W in order to provide a domain condition de…ning some minimum requirements that all de…nitions of UE exploitation should satisfy. 19 Given any de…nition of exploitation, let N ter N and N ted N denote, respectively, the set of exploiters and the set of exploited agents at a given allocation, where N ter \ N ted = ?. A basic axiom can now be formally introduced that captures the key intuitions of UE exploitation theory. Labour Exploitation requires that, at any equilibrium, a de…nition of exploitation determines whether each propertyless agent 2 W is exploited or not by identifying a nonnegative vector c e -call it an exploitation reference bundle (hereafter, ERB) -and its associated labour content, c e l . The ERB must have two properties:
(I): It must be on 's budget line, i.e. it must be (just) a¤ordable, at prices p, by a propertyless agent 2 W , who supplies units of labour at a wage rate w (pc e = w ).
(II): It must be technically feasible with an e¢ cient production process ( c e 2 (c e ) \ @P ).
The labour content of the ERB -and thus the amount of labour that receives -is then identi…ed as the labour necessary to produce the ERB e¢ ciently as net output, c e l . Thus, if 2 W supplies , and is more than c e l , then is regarded as contributing more labour than receives. According to Labour Exploitation, the de…nition of exploitation should consider all such agents as exploited, i.e. as members of N ted .
As a domain condition for the admissible class of exploitation-forms, Labour Exploitation captures some key insights of UE exploitation theory that are shared by all of the main approaches. 20 In the UE theory, the exploitation status of agent is determined by the di¤erence between the amount of labour that 'contributes'to the economy, and the amount she 'receives'. In economies with the type of labour heterogeneity considered here, the former quantity is given by the amount of labour supplied, . 21 In contrast, there are many possible UE views concerning the amount of labour that each agent receives. As a domain condition, Labour Exploitation provides some minimal, key restrictions on the de…nition of the amount of labour that a theoretically relevant subset of agents receives. 22 First, the amount of labour that 2 W receives depends on her income, or more precisely, it is determined in equilibrium by some reference bundle that can purchase (property (I)). In the standard approaches, the ERB is the bundle actually chosen by the agent. Labour Exploitation is weaker in that it only requires that the ERB be potentially a¤ordable.
Second, the amount of labour associated with the ERB -and thus 'received'by an agent -is related to the production conditions of the economy. More precisely, Labour Exploitation states that the ERB be technologically feasible as net output, and de…nes its labour content as the amount of labour socially necessary to produce it (property (II)). Observe that the axiom requires that the amount of labour associated with each ERB be uniquely determined with reference to production conditions, but it does not specify how such amount should be chosen. There may be in principle many (ef-…cient) ways of producing the ERB c e , and thus of determining its labour content c e l . Third, Labour Exploitation is weak also because it does not provide comprehensive conditions for the determination of exploitation status: it only focuses on the strict subset of agents who own no physical assets and is silent on the exploitation status of all other agents. Further, it imposes no restrictions on the set of exploiters N ter N .
Finally, it is worth noting that Labour Exploitation allows the ERB, c e , to be variable and a function of equilibrium prices (p; w). 23 To verify that Labour Exploitation captures the key tenets of UE ex-ploitation, it is worth checking that all of the main de…nitions satisfy it. Consider De…nition 2: the ERB is the actual consumption bundle of agent 2 W -i.e. at any reproducible solution, c e c -and its labour content is given by choosing c e as the production activity that minimises direct labour among those that produce c e as net output, so that c e l = l:v: (c e ). Consider De…nition 3: the ERB is again the actual consumption bundle of agent 2 W -i.e. at any reproducible solution, c e c -but its labour content is given by choosing c e as the production activity that minimises direct labour among the pro…t-rate maximising activities that produce c e as net output, so that c e l = l:v: (c e ; p; w). 24 Consider De…nition 5: take any (p; w) and associated aggregate production activity p;w , and let c = pc pb p;w , if pb p;w > 0 and c = 0, otherwise. In the New Interpretation, the ERB is de…ned counterfactually by identifying the share of net output that agent 2 W could (just) buy -formally, c e c b p;w -and its labour content is given by choosing c e c p;w , so that c e l = c p;w l . In general, for any 2 W , the ERB is di¤erent from the actual consumption bundle chosen -that is, in general c e 6 = c , unlike in De…nitions 2 and 3.
The previous arguments forcefully suggest that Labour Exploitation does represent an appropriate domain condition in exploitation theory: it is formally weak and it incorporates some widely shared views on UE exploitation. Thus, although the axiom is not trivial and not all de…nitions in the literature satisfy it, all of the major approaches do. 25 The next question, then, is how to discriminate among the various de…nitions satisfying it.
A key tenet of UE exploitation theory is the idea that, in private ownership economies with unequal distribution of productive assets, pro…ts are one of the main determinants of the existence of exploitation, and of inequalities in well-being freedom. Given private ownership of productive assets, one should expect pro…ts to make a transfer of social surplus and social labour from asset-poor agents to wealthy ones possible, and a general correspondence should exist between positive pro…ts and the exploitation of at least the poorest segments of the working class. This is formalised in the next 24 Formally, for De…nition 2, c e 2 arg min f l j = ( l ;
; ) 2 (c e )g, and for De…nition 3, c e 2 arg min f l j = ( l ;
; ) 2 (c e ) \ P (p; w)g. 25 Based on Flaschel's [5] , [6] notion of actual labour values, another de…nition of exploitation can be derived that satis…es Labour Exploitation. In contrast, the subjectivist de…nition of exploitation based on workers'preferences recently proposed by Matsuo [15] does not meet Labour Exploitation. whenever
A number of points are worth noting about the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle. First, it is formulated without specifying any de…nition of exploitation: whatever the de…nition adopted, propertyless workers should be exploited if and only if pro…ts are positive in equilibrium. Second, it is formally weak in that it only focuses on a strict subset of the set of agents N ; it is silent on the set of exploiters N ter ; it imposes no constraints on the de…nition of exploitation in economies where W + = ? in equilibrium; and when equilibrium pro…ts are zero it only requires that some propertyless agents not be exploited. Thus, it establishes a rather weak link between exploitation and pro…ts. Third, it is fairly general, because it both applies to economies with a complex class structure, and allows for the possibility that propertyless workers are a strict subset of the set of exploited agents N ted . Note that it focuses only on propertyless agents who perform some labour, W + . This restriction is theoretically appropriate, since the exploitation status of agents who do not engage in any economic activities is unclear. Fourth, it allows for fairly general assumptions on agents and technology, including heterogeneous preferences and skills, a convex technology, and so on.
The next theorem characterises the class of de…nitions of exploitation that satisfy Labour Exploitation and such that the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds.
Theorem 1: For any de…nition of exploitation satisfying Labour Exploitation, the following statements are equivalent for any economy E 2 E and any reproducible solution (p; w) with aggregate production activity p;w : (1) the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds;
(2) if max > 0 then for all 2 W + , there is 2 P ( l = )\@P such that b 2 R n + , pb > w and ( l ; ; ) = c e l ; c e ; c e , some > 1.
Theorem 1 provides a demarcation line (condition (2)) which allows one to test which of a potentially in…nite number of de…nitions properly capture a key property of pro…ts and exploitation in capitalist economies. Though its main theoretical implication is drawn in Corollary 1 below, it can be interpreted as follows. The Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle states that every employed propertyless agent is exploited if and only if equilibrium pro…ts are positive. According to Labour Exploitation, the exploitation status of propertyless agents is determined by identifying a pro…le of exploitation reference bundles that are a¤ordable by the agents and producible with less than units of labour for all exploited workers. By Theorem 1, in every convex economy, the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds if and only if positive equilibrium pro…ts are associated with the existence of a pro…le of reference bundles -call them the pro…t-reference bundles, b . According to condition (2), for all workers 2 W + , the pro…t-reference bundles must be producible with a technically e¢ cient process using units of labour, yield positive pro…ts, and dominate the ERBs. Theorem 1 thus identi…es a general condition for the validity of the relation between exploitation and pro…ts, 26 but, methodologically, it also suggests that di¤erent views about exploitation, and the analysis of some key features of exploitation theory, should focus on the choice of the relevant (exploitation and pro…t) reference bundles. 27 Theorem 1 does not identify a unique de…nition of exploitation that meets the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, but rather a class of de…nitions satisfying condition (2) . Yet it has surprising implications for the main approaches in exploitation theory. For there are economies in which for all 2 W + , condition (2) never holds, if either De…nition 2 or De…nition 3 is adopted. In contrast, De…nition 5 satis…es condition (2) , and thus the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds, in general.
Corollary 1:
There exists an economy E 2 E and a reproducible solution 26 Actually, Theorem 1 proves an even stronger result. The Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle allows for the possibility that, when pro…ts are zero, some agents in W + be exploited. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that for all de…nitions satisfying Labour Exploitation, condition (2) holds if and only if the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds and no agent in W + is exploited whenever pro…ts are zero. The latter property follows directly from Labour Exploitation. 27 It is worth noting that if one restricts the analysis to simple economies with Leontief technologies and homogeneous skills, then any de…nition meeting Labour Exploitation also satis…es the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle. 
Exploitation as a social relation
Given the theoretical relevance of the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle in exploitation theory, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 provide strong support for De…nition 5 as the appropriate notion of UE exploitation. In this section and in the next, two extensions of the analysis are presented, which provide further support to the New Interpretation. For it is shown that De…nition 5 can be extended to analyse, …rst, the exploitation status of all agents and the existence of exploitative relations; and then the correspondence between exploitation and pro…ts outside of equilibrium allocations, in economies with heterogeneous preferences and unequal endowments of physical and human capital. This suggests that, if the New Interpretation is adopted, then exploitation theory can be extended to yield interesting insights on unequal relations between agents in advanced capitalist economies.
Theorem 2 proves that, based on De…nition 5, it is possible to derive the exploitation status of all agents and a more general relation between pro…ts and exploitation beyond the subset of propertyless agents. Theorem 2 emphasises the importance of wealth inequalities and pro…ts in generating exploitation and in determining the exploitation structure of an economy. Formally, De…nition 5 can be interpreted as stating that an agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the share of social labour she contributes is greater (resp., lower) than the share of total income she receives. Given a positive pro…t rate, and for a given amount of labour performed, Theorem 2 suggests that the key determinant of agents'income -and thus of their exploitation status -is their wealth.
Theorem 2-(1) completely characterises the exploitation structure of an economy in equilibrium: an agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if her share of social wealth is lower (resp., higher) than her share of social labour. Theorem 2- (2) shows that at the two extremes of the wealth distribution, exploitation status can be determined independently of individual choices, an intuition of standard exploitation theory that is proved robust. On the one hand, agents with a su¢ ciently high initial wealth are exploiters regardless of the amount of work they expend in production. On the other hand, if a subsistence bundle exists, the set of agents that are exploited regardless of their individual choices is larger than the set of propertyless workers (those who have 'nothing to lose but their chains'), as it also includes workers with nonnegligible initial wealth. This set can be sizable if b is not just a physical subsistence bundle, but it incorporates moral and social elements. Jointly with Theorem 2-(3), this establishes a correspondence between positive pro…ts and the exploitation of a larger set of agents than the set of propertyless workers. Indeed, an important property of the New Interpretation can be immediately derived from Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 2: Consider an economy E 2 E. Let (p; w) be a reproducible solution for E with aggregate production activity p;w such that W + 6 = ?. Under De…nition 5, the following statements are equivalent: (1) the equilibrium rate of pro…t is positive, max > 0;
(2) some agents are exploited, W + N ted 6 = ?;
(3) some agents are exploiters, N ter 6 = ?.
Corollary 2 implies that in equilibrium positive pro…ts are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of exploitative relations, where the latter notion can be formalised as requiring that N ted 6 = ? if and only if N ter 6 = ?. This seems a weak and reasonable property in exploitation theory: some agents are exploited if and only if there is someone exploiting them. Yet Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] have proved that none of the main received de…nitions satis…es it in general. In contrast, Corollary 2 shows that, according to the New Interpretation, exploitation has an inherently relational nature. Further, the New Interpretation captures inequalities between classes of individuals concerning the allocation of labour. In fact, it can be proved that, unlike in other approaches, if some other good is used as the exploitation numéraire in De…nition 5, neither the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle nor Corollary 2 holds (Yoshihara and Veneziani [39] ).
Relation with the literature
Although the main contribution of this paper lies in the discussion of a new de…nition of exploitation and in a novel axiomatic approach to exploitation theory, it is worth brie ‡y discussing the relation with some traditional strands of the literature. The uninterested reader can safely skip this subsection.
The previous results can be read as a generalisation of the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem (hereafter, FMT), which states that the existence of exploitation is synonymous with positive aggregate pro…ts. 28 For they prove that there exists a nonempty class of de…nitions of exploitation such that a correspondence between exploitation and pro…ts exists in general convex economies with heterogeneous agents. Yet, the previous analysis bears a relation to the literature on the FMT only at the broad conceptual level.
The Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle is logically different from the standard FMT. For unlike in the literature on the FMT, the Principle applies to economies with a complex class structure and focuses on the exploitation status of a speci…c set of agents, namely those without any assets, rather than on the aggregate rate of exploitation in the economy. Indeed, as noted above, the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle imposes no constraints on the de…nition of exploitation at equilibria in which propertyless agents do not work (W + = ?). Moreover, it does not require that when equilibrium pro…ts are zero there be no exploitation in the economy, but only that some propertyless agents are not exploited.
Finally, in the standard Okishio-Morishima approach, the existence of (aggregate) UE exploitation is just a numerical representation of the existence of surplus products in a productive economy. Thus, the FMT establishes the equivalence between positive pro…ts and the productiveness of the economy measured in terms of the labour numéraire. Yet, analogous results can be proved when productiveness is measured in terms of any other good (this is the Commodity Exploitation Theorem; Roemer [22] ; see also Fujimoto and Fujita [12] and Yoshihara and Veneziani [36] ), which raises doubts on the signi…cance of the FMT. Instead, if the New Interpretation is adopted, no equivalence between pro…ts and exploitation holds if another commodity is used to de…ne exploitation, as Yoshihara and Veneziani [38] have shown.
6 Exploitation, pro…ts and disequilibrium Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 complete the analysis of the relation between exploitation and pro…ts, and extend the main insights of UE exploitation theory to all agents in the general economies considered in this paper, under De…nition 5, in equilibrium. In this section, an extension of De…nition 5 is proposed, and a general relation between exploitation and pro…ts is derived, at any feasible allocation.
The key point to note is that there are various possible ways of conceptualising exploitation at general disequilibrium allocations and, consequently, there is no trivial way of extending De…nition 5. For outside of a reproducible solution, it is unclear whether exploitation status should be determined relative to the actual features of the allocation. On the one hand, if individual plans are not realised, coordination failures arise, and perhaps even sheer mistakes are made, then by focusing on actual data one may be capturing purely transient and ephemeral phenomena unrelated to the structural features of the economy. On the other hand, one may insist that only the information contained in the actual allocation is relevant. For, ultimately, the actual features of the allocation are what matters to the agents.
In the extension of De…nition 5 proposed here, the actual features of the allocation, including the price vector, the aggregate production activity, and the individual work and consumption choices remain central, but the e¤ects of sheer individual mistakes in technical choices, or of temporary market imbalances leading to productive ine¢ ciency are discounted.
For any 2 P with b 2 R n + nf0g, let min f j ( l ; ; + b ) 2 @P and = 1g. Note that is well-de…ned for all 2 P . Further, if = 2 @P , then > 1, while if 2 @P , then = 1. Then, for all c 2 R n + , c 5 b , de…ne The following de…nition identi…es the set of propertyless agents who are exploited at any given allocation. holds. Further, note that in section 4 a weak formulation of Labour Exploitation is adopted, which focuses on reproducible solutions. It is straightforward, however, to extend the axiom to all price vectors (p; w) with associated aggregate production activity p;w and, from a theoretical viewpoint, none of the arguments used to defend Labour Exploitation depends on the equilibrium assumption. Therefore one may argue that it remains an appropriate domain condition to de…ne UE exploitation even at disequilibrium allocations. From this perspective, it is worth noting that De…nition 7 satis…es Labour Exploitation, at any (p; w) with associated aggregate production activity p;w . 30 Theoretically, in De…nitions 6 and 7, the actual allocation of the economy plays a pivotal role. In order to de…ne the exploitation status of propertyless agents, the actual price vector and the actual individual choices on work and 29 Assumptions A0 A3 in Appendix 8.1 guarantee that l:v: (c; ) is well-de…ned and bounded below by 0. 30 To see this, let the ERB be c e c b p;w and let c e arg min f l j 2 (c e ; p;w )g, so that c e l = l:v: c b p;w ; p;w : 24 consumption are central. The only possible deviation from actual data concerns the focus on technically e¢ cient production activities in the de…nition of labour content: activities in the interior of the production possibility set are the product of transient contingencies and do not reveal much about the structural features of the economy. 31 Yet the set of admissible e¢ cient activities in De…nitions 6 and 7 is signi…cantly constrained by the actual social production point p;w (unlike in Roemer's or Morishima's de…nitions).
Let W = P 2W be the total labour expended by propertyless agents at a given allocation. For all 2 N , let ( ; ; ; c ) be individually feasible if it satis…es constraints (1)-(4) of M P . Based on De…nition 7, Theorem 3 establishes a general relation between exploitation and pro…ts at any feasible allocations. ; c ) 2N that is individually feasible for all 2 N and such that some propertyless agents work, W + 6 = ?.
Then, the following statements are equivalent for any 2 P l = W \ @P with b 2 R n + : (1) pb w l > 0 holds; Theorem 3 states that a general relation between exploitation and pro…ts holds, at any price vector and corresponding allocation, provided productive ine¢ ciencies and temporary disequilibrium phenomena are ruled out: at every technically e¢ cient production vector (which is feasible using actual, e¤ective labour W ), society realises positive pro…ts if and only if every propertyless worker is exploited. This result is fairly general: no signi…cant restriction is imposed on individual behaviour (except that income should not be wasted: the budget constraint holds for all agents) and on the actual allocation. As a result, Theorem 3 does not establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of positive pro…ts and the exploitation of propertyless workers at the actual allocation, and the social production point p;w may, or may not, coincide with one of the vectors . For given the rather large set of admissible allocations, the link between pro…ts and exploitation may be somewhat weakened. 32 However, Theorem 3 derives the general conditions under which propertyless workers are exploited if and only if the economy can generate positive pro…ts, starting from the actual individual consumption/leisure choices, price system, and aggregate production activity, even if exchanges do not take place at equilibrium prices. Indeed, if the actual social production point p;w under the presumption of Theorem 3 is technically ine¢ cient with b p;w 2 R n + n f0g, there is some 2 P l = W \ @P such that = p;w , and then l:v: c b ; = l:v: c b p;w ; p;w holds. Therefore, Theorem 3 implies that the exploitation status of employed propertyless agents in this disequilibrium feasible allocation can be veri…ed by examining the pro…tability of the counterfactual production point = p;w at (p; w).
Conclusions
What is exploitation? The analysis developed in this paper provides two important, albeit partial answers to the question in the opening paragraph, focusing on the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour. First, from a methodological viewpoint, an axiomatic approach provides key insights into UE exploitation in general convex economies with agents endowed with heterogeneous preferences and di¤erent amounts of physical and human capital. In these economies, the de…nition of exploitation is inherently ambiguous and controversial. An axiomatic framework allows for a general analysis of the main approaches, and indeed of all conceivable de…nitions, that starts from …rst principles, thus explicitly discussing the positive and normative foundations of UE exploitation.
The axiomatic results in section 4 are quite striking. A weak domain condition called Labour Exploitation is presented which captures the key insights of UE exploitation and which is satis…ed by all of the main approaches. Then, Theorem 1 identi…es a demarcation line that partitions the set of (in…nitely many, conceivable) de…nitions satisfying Labour Exploitation into those that preserve the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, and those that do not. Based on Theorem 1, Corollary 1 shows that among all of the main approaches, only a de…nition of exploitation related to the 'New Interpretation'satis…es the principle in general. Given the theoretical relevance of the relation between exploitation and pro…ts in exploitation theory, the axiomatic analysis provides signi…cant support to the New Interpretation, as opposed to alternative views.
Both Labour Exploitation and the Pro…t-Exploitation Correspondence Principle are theoretically robust and formally weak properties. But even if they are rejected on theoretical or exegetical grounds, the methodological conclusion of the paper stands: signi…cant progress can be made in exploitation theory by adopting an axiomatic method.
Second, from a substantive viewpoint, the New Interpretation has several desirable properties and preserves some of the key intuitions of exploitation theory. This is important because the di¢ culty of extending the normative and positive insights of UE exploitation outside of stylised, two-class economies has produced signi…cant scepticism in the literature about the relevance of exploitation theory in advanced capitalist economies.
According to the New Interpretation, an agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour she contributes is greater (resp., lower) than the share of social labour that she receives via her income. This de…nition conceives of exploitation as the result of the competitive allocation of social labour (rather than productive ine¢ ciencies, or market imperfections) and it has a clear empirical content. Moreover, it preserves the fundamental link between the appropriation of surplus and the exploitation of (at least some) workers in general economies both in equilibrium (Corollary 1) andremarkably -outside of equilibrium allocations (Theorem 3).
Furthermore, under the New Interpretation, it possible to derive the exploitation structure of general economies with heterogeneous preferences, physical assets, and skills (Theorem 2). From a normative perspective, the exploitation status of agents is in general related to inequalities in the allocation of labour and income, as well as to wealth inequalities. And for both very wealthy and very poor agents, exploitation status is independent of individual choices, as in the classical-Marxian approach. Perhaps even more interestingly, under the New Interpretation, UE exploitation is an inherently relational phenomenon, whereby some agents are exploited if and only if some agents are exploiting them (Corollary 2).
To be sure, the results obtained in this paper are not su¢ cient to conclude that a logically coherent and normatively relevant de…nition exists which preserves all of the key insights of UE exploitation theory. Although the economies analysed in this paper are signi…cantly more general than those usually considered in exploitation theory, they remain fairly stylised.
There are several reasons, however, to believe that the main conclusions of the paper can be signi…cantly extended, and the New Interpretation may provide the foundations for a general theoretical framework that can deal with many unresolved issues in exploitation theory. For example, it can be shown that all of the key analytical results of the paper remain valid if, in addition to heterogeneous labour skills, one also allows for di¤erent types of labour inputs (provided each agent's e¤ective labour contribution per unit of time is measured by her marginal productivity).
The New Interpretation may also provide interesting insights on another tenet of exploitation theory, namely the correspondence between class and exploitation status (Roemer [22] ). For example, Yoshihara and Veneziani [35] and Yoshihara [34] have proved that, unlike in the standard approaches, if the New Interpretation is adopted, it is possible to derive the full class and exploitation structure, and a correspondence between class and exploitation in economies with a general convex technology and agents endowed with identical preferences and skills. To extend these results to economies with heterogeneous agents is an interesting direction for further research.
Appendix

Assumptions on the production set P
Let R be the set of nonpositive real numbers. The following assumptions on P R 2n+1 hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 0 (A0). P is a closed convex cone in R 2n+1 and 0 2 P . Assumption 1 (A1). For all 2 P , if 0 then l > 0. Assumption 2 (A2). For all c 2 R n + , there is a 2 P such that b = c. Assumption 3 (A3). For all 2 P and all 0 2 R R n R n + , if 0 5 then 0 2 P .
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output vector. A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as a net output. A3 is a standard free disposal condition. To be precise, the existence of an equilibrium is proved for a theoretically relevant subset of the set of economies E. It focuses on the polar case where C = R n + and it generalises the proofs of existence in Roemer [2] , [3] . Yoshihara and Veneziani [5] prove the existence of a RS for another polar case where C = c 2 R n + j c = b for some subsistence vector b 2 R n + n f0g, u is not strictly increasing on C, and agents minimise labour.
Proofs of formal results
Theorem A1.1 below generalises Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.8 of Roemer [2] in two respects: …rst, although the assumptions on technology are the same, a more general model of individuals is considered by allowing for unequal skills and general, heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure. Second, the subsistence wage hypothesis is dropped in favour of a more general endogenous determination of the equilibrium wage rate (see De…nition 1(iv) above). Despite these generalisations, the existence of a nontrivial RS is proved for essentially the same set of initial physical endowments as in Roemer [2] . Note that Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.8 of Roemer [2] do not show the existence of a non-trivial RS: the non-triviality of a RS is guaranteed only by referring to the Fundamental Marxian Theorem.
It is assumed that u is continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly increasing on C for all 2 N . Further, the following standard boundary condition of utility functions is assumed: u (c; ) > u (0; 0 ) for any c 2 R n + n f0g, and any ; 0 2 [0; 1]. This assumption implies that any propertyless agent 2 W would rather participate in the labour market to earn some revenue and purchase some consumption goods, than drop out of the labour market consuming nothing. Finally, A1 is slightly strengthened to require that some produced inputs be used in the production of commodities: is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence c 0k ; 0k ; 0k such that for each p k ; w k 2M + , c 0k ; 0k ; 0k 2 B (p k ; w k ) with c 0k ; 0k ; 0k ! (c 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) as p k ; w k ! (p; w). Then, for p k ; w k which is su¢ ciently close to (p; w), u c 0k ; For any 2 N , if (p; w) 2M + is associated with pb w l < 0 for all 2 P n f0g, then (c ; ; ) 2 O (p; w) implies = 0. However, by A4, for any p > 0, there is w 0 > 0 such that for any w 5 w 0 , max 2P : p =p! pb w l is non-negative, so that there is (c ; ; For each (p; w) 2M + , de…ne the aggregate excess demand correspondence:
Given the above Lemmas and the de…nition of P (p; w; !), it follows that Z is compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M + . To see that it is non-empty, …rstly suppose that (p; w) 2M + is such that pb w l < 0 for all 2 P n f0g. Then, P (p; w; !) = f0g = P (p; w; !), so that there exists ( ) 2N such that = 0 for all . Next, if pb w l = 0 for some 2 P n f0g, P (p; w; !) 2 arg max 0 2P : p 0 =p! pb 0 w 0 l holds by A1 0 , so that P (p; w; !)n f0g 6
= ?, and so if 2 P (p; w; !)n f0g then there is ( ) 2N such that P 2N = , and p = p! for all . In either case, for (c ; ) in O (p; w), it follows that (c ; ; ) 2 O (p; w) for each 2 N . By de…nition, since P Proof. 1. First, we prove that Z satis…es the Strong Walras Law (SWL), namely for each (p; w) 2M + , and each (z 1 ; z 2 ) 2 Z (p; w), pz 1 + wz 2 = 0. In fact, for each (p; w) 2M + , and each (z 1 ; z 2 ) 2 Z (p; w),
since pc = p b w l + w for every , by the strict monotonicity of u .
2. Next, we prove that Z satis…es the following Boundary condition: there is a (e p; e w) 2M + such that for every sequence p k ; w k M + with p k ; w k ! (p; w) 2M n M + , there is an M such that for every k = M , (e p; e w) z k 1 ; z k 2 > 0 holds for every z k 1 ; z k 2 2 Z p k ; w k . Take a su¢ ciently 6 small but positive real number ", and de…ne (e p; e w) 2M + as e w = " > 0, and for all j, e p j = 1 " n > 0. Then, consider any price vector (p; w) 2M n M + , such that p i = 0 for one i. Firstly, note that because p k ; w k M + , it is possible that w k = 0 for su¢ ciently large k. Thus, in this case, c k = 0 for any 2 W . However, in this case, the corresponding max k is strictly positive by A4, and so p k ; w k > 0 for any 2 N nW . Hence, by the strict monotonicity of utility functions, c k 0 for any 2 N nW , and in particular, c k i is su¢ ciently large at p k for su¢ ciently large k. Secondly, p k ; w k M + may also contain the case that w k > 0 but max k is zero for su¢ ciently large k. In this case, because of the boundary condition for utility functions, any 2 N optimally supplies a positive amount of labour, so that p k ; w k > 0. Thus, by the strict monotonicity of utility functions, c k 0 for any 2 N , and in particular, c k i is su¢ ciently large at p k for su¢ ciently large k. In sum, noting that k 2 P (p k ; w k ; !) is bounded above, it follows that z k 1i > 0 is su¢ ciently large for p k su¢ ciently close to p. Then, even if e w > 0, e wz k 2 will never compensate for e pz k 1 > 0, since z k 2 is bounded below by P 2N s whereas e pz k 1 grows in…nitely large due to a su¢ ciently large z k 1i > 0. Thus, there is a neighbourhood H ((p; w) ; ) of (p; w) such that (e p; e w) z k 1 ; z k 2 > 0 for all p k ; w k 2 H ((p; w) ; ) \ M + . A similar argument holds if (p; w) 2M n M + , with p i = 0, for more than one i.
3. Set K m co (q; w) 2M + j dist ((q; w) ; M n M + ) = 1 m . Then, fK m g is an increasing family of compact convex sets and M + = [ m K m . Then, as in Border ([1], Theorem 18.13, p. 85), it follows that there exist (p; w) 2M + and z 2 Z (p; w) such that z 5 0. This fact together with (SWL) imply that z = 0. In fact, since p > 0, (SWL) and z 5 0 imply that z 1 = 0. Second, if w > 0, then z 2 = 0 holds by (SWL) and z 5 0. Thus, suppose w = 0 and z 2 P Lemma A1.3 proves the existence of a …xed point for the aggregate excess demand correspondences: there exists a price vector (p; w) 2M + such that conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) of De…nition 1 are satis…ed. In order to complete the proof of existence of a RS, it is necessary to show that condition (iii) also holds. Theorem A1.1 provides a condition on aggregate social endowments under which the capital constraint (iii) is satis…ed.
Theorem A1.1: Let A0, A1 0 A3 hold and let u be continuous, quasiconcave, strictly increasing on C , and satisfying the boundary condition for all 2 N . For any pro…le = (! ) 2N with P 2N ! = ! 0 which satis…es A4, there exist a distribution 0 = (! 0 ) 2N with P 2N ! 0 = ! 0 and a RS (p; w) 2M + for the economy E(P; N ; u; s; 0 ) with p! 0 = p! for all 2 N .
Proof. Let P; N ; s, and = (! ) 2N satisfy A0, A1 0 A4, and let u be such that for all 2 N , u is continuous, quasi-concave, strictly increasing on C , and it satis…es the boundary condition. Then, we can apply Lemmas A1.1-A1.3, to prove that there exists (p ; w ) 2M + such that P 2N c P 2N b = 0 and P 2N l P 2N = 0. Thus, (p ; w ) is associated with p b w l = 0 for some 2 P n f0g. In fact, if (p ; w ) is such that p b w l < 0 for all 2 P n f0g, then = 0 for all 2 N , but > 0 and c 6 = 0 follow from w > 0 and the boundary condition for utility functions. (Note that if p b w l < 0 for all 2 P n f0g, then w > 0.) Hence, P 2N c P 2N b 0 and P 2N l P 2N < 0 follow if p b w l < 0 for all 2 P n f0g, which is a contradiction. Thus, p b w l = 0 for some 2 P n f0g.
Since p b w l = 0 for some 2 P n f0g, (0; ; ; c ) 2N is a pro…le of optimal solutions of all M P with p = p ! for all 2 N , thus p = p ! at (p ; w ). By A4, the existence of such pro…le is guaranteed. Let us de…ne 0 = (! 0 ) 2N as ! 0 = for each 2 N . Then, since p ! 0 = p ! holds for each 2 N , it follows that (0;
; ; c ) 2N remains a pro…le of optimal solutions of all M P such that P 2N c P 2N b = 0 and P 2N l P 2N = 0. Moreover = ! 0 , and so condition (iii) of De…nition 1 is also satis…ed. Hence, for the economy E(P; N ; u; s; 0 ), (p ; w ) is a RS with associated pro…le (0;
; ; c ) 2N .
As shown in Roemer ([2]; Appendix II) and Yoshihara ([4] ; Proposition 1), the proof of existence of a RS is based on the identi…cation of a speci…c 8 domain of capital stocks, !, and of an appropriate price vector (p ; w ), as in the existence proof of the stationary-state dynamic competitive equilibrium. This is because a RS is a one-shot slice of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
In the classical economies analysed in [2] and [4] , since the aggregate consumption vector is exogenously given, it is easy to identify the set of endowment vectors such that there exists a feasible allocation in terms of De…nition 1(ii)-(iii). Given any such vector, to prove the existence of a RS one only needs to …nd an e¢ cient production activity which is feasible in terms of De…nition 1(ii)-(iii): if such an activity is found, then the existence of a RS can be proved by applying the supporting hyperplane theorem. Because of this simple structure, Yoshihara ([4]; Proposition 1) provides a full characterisation of the set of endowment vectors such that a RS exists.
In contrast, this paper considers an economy with heterogeneous agents, in which the aggregate consumption vector is endogenously determined, the set of endowment vectors such that there exists a feasible allocation in terms of De…nition 1(ii)-(iii) cannot be identi…ed prior to the determination of the price vector. As a result, Theorem A1.1 does not provide a complete characterisation of the domain of endowments such that a RS exists. It does prove, however, that starting from any aggregate endowment vector satisfying A4, there exists an equilibrium price vector such that the economy can 'purchase'another suitable aggregate endowment vector at those prices, which makes the afore-mentioned stationary-state feasible.
